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W. Dembski [7, 9] claims to have established a robust decision process that can determine when
observed structures in the natural world can be attributed to intelligent design. Dembski’s decision
process first asks whether a structure as an outcome can be explained by the regularity of natural
laws. If not, and the outcome can be “specified”, a randomness test is devised to determine whether
an observed low probability outcome indicates non natural design.
As other authors have shown [14, 23], the Dembski test is unworkable as it provides no reliable
way of assessing the probability of these events. This paper argues that a decision process based on
a Martin Lo¨f universal randomness test does not suffer from the failings of the Dembski approach
and should replace it. Indeed, a universal randomness test will show that most observed outcomes
in the natural world are not random; they are highly ordered. However this does not necessarily
demonstrate a design intervention. It becomes clear that the critical decision is not between chance
and design, but between natural laws and a design intervention. Unless the chance hypothesis is
eliminated in the first step of the decision process the decision will be strongly biased in favour
of design. However, if chance is eliminated first, natural explanations of outcomes would seem to
be far more credible than postulating a non natural design explanation. The Dembski decision
process is flawed. Dembski also introduces a 4th law of thermodynamics, the law of conservation of
information, to argue that information cannot emerge from random processes. However, if a more
robust measure, the deficiency in randomness, is used to define what Dembski means by information,
the so called 4th law is seen to contain no more than the second law of thermodynamics. Introducing
a 4th law obscures the fact that the second law allows order to arise by natural means. For example,
low entropy outcomes representing order emerge when low entropy photons from the sun generate
low entropy living systems on earth.
In conclusion despite the good intentions, the Dembski approach fails. Because the universal
Martin Lo¨f test is scientifically valid and more effective in identifying order, the scientific community
should refuse to engage in any discussions on the possibilities of design interventions in nature unless
the discussion is articulated in terms of the Martin Lo¨f universal randomness test.
keywords randomness test; Intelligent Design; dynamics of evolution; algorithmic information
theory; algorithmic entropy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
William Dembski in a number of books including “The
Design Inference” [7] and “No Free Lunch” [9] makes two
significant claims. Firstly Dembski claims that there is
a robust decision process that can show when certain
structures observed in the natural world are the prod-
uct of design interventions rather than natural processes.
Secondly, Dembski introduces his law of conservation of
information as the 4th law of thermodynamics. This law
in effect states that information can only be conserved
or decrease, but cannot increase by natural processes.
He then uses this law to argue that structures that are
high, in what he terms “information”, cannot emerge by
chance.
The essence of the first of these claims, is that a ro-
bust decision process can be used to determine whether
a structure, such as the flagellum that provides motil-
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ity to certain bacteria (see Behe [1]), is an outcome of
evolutionary processes, or is the product of non natu-
ral design. The Dembski decision process considers first
whether such a structure can be explained by the regular-
ity of natural laws. If not, a randomness test is devised
based on identifying an event E that is independent of
any side information. Such an event E is termed “spec-
ified” to distinguish it from other equally likely but un-
surprising events. For example Dembski would see the
random outcome of tossing a coin 200 times as not being
specified, but the ordered outcome of tossing 200 heads
in a row is specified as it would be a surprise. When the
probability of such a specified event occurring by chance
is low, according to Dembski, the event can be deemed to
be due to intelligent design, as chance can be eliminated.
In mathematical terms, if P (E|H) is the probability of
the specified event, Dembski defines the information ID
embodied in the outcome by ID = −log2P (E|H) so that
low probability corresponds to high ID. This informa-
tion characterising such an event is known as “Complex
Specified Information”. It should be noted that while this
definition of information can be used, it is unwise to do so
as there are ambiguities that can be confusing. Elsberry
2and Shallit [13, 14] and Shallit and Elsberry [23] suggest
the term “anti-information” to distinguish this informa-
tion from that used in Algorithmic Information Theory.
In this paper, to avoid confusion with commonly recog-
nised information measures, the Dembski measure will
be called “D-information”. D-information has been de-
fined so that the lower the probability of an observed out-
come, the higher is the Complex Specified Information,
the higher the order embodied in the structures and in
Dembski’s terms, the higher the complexity. In contrast
to the Dembski approach, the common mathematical un-
derstanding of Algorithmic Information Theory is that
those outcomes that have high D-information exhibit low
algorithmic complexity, low algorithmic entropy and low
algorithmic information. These outcomes are seen to be
highly ordered. As is discussed later, an example of a
highly ordered outcome that represents low algorithmic
information (or low algorithmic entropy) would be the
appearance of 200 heads in 200 tosses of a coin. Such
an outcome is unlikely to occur by chance, and would be
termed a surprise event.
This paper makes three main points. The first point, is
that as Elsberry and his colleague Shallit have suggested
[13, 23], Kolmogorov’s deficiency in randomness provides
a far more satisfactory measure for D-information than
that proposed by Dembski.
The second point is that, as the Dembski’s approach
does not adequately define a randomness test that can
be implemented in practice, it should be replaced by the
agreed mathematical measure of randomness known as a
universal Martin Lo¨f randomness test. Not only does the
universal randomness test achieve Dembski’s purpose, it
is also avoids all the confusion and argument around the
Dembski approach. The Martin Lo¨f approach using Kol-
mogorov’s deficiency in randomness measure, shows that
the Dembski decision process to identify intelligent de-
sign is flawed, as it eliminates natural explanations for
surprise outcomes before it eliminates chance. As a con-
sequence, the process will assign design interventions to
events when further knowledge would indicate natural
causes. In practical terms, the fundamental choice to be
made, given the available information, is whether natu-
ral laws provide a better explanation than a design in-
tervention. As the Dembski decision route avoids com-
paring the two most likely possibilities on equal terms
it attributes non natural design to events just because
natural events are seldom purely random.
This paper’s third point is that Dembski’s 4th law of
thermodynamics, i.e. his law of conservation of the in-
formation ID, is unnecessary. It contains no more than
the second law of thermodynamics and is equivalent to
the unsurprising statement that in a closed system en-
tropy can only be conserved or increase. While Dem-
bski uses his law of conservation of information to ar-
gue that highly ordered structures, i.e. those with high
D-information structures cannot emerge by chance, the
argument is invalid. The earth is not a closed system
and, on earth, highly ordered living structures, do emerge
by natural processes when order, manifested as photons
from the sun, or from some other source, is harnessed
to create new ordered structures without any decrease in
total entropy of the universe. Given the universe, there
is no evidence that the injection of information, or its
equivalent the injection of low entropy from a non natu-
ral source, is required to produce any known structure.
However, if such a possibility needs to be considered, a
Martin Lo¨f universal randomness test should be used in-
stead of the Dembski approach, as no test either designed,
or yet to be designed, can do better than a universal Mar-
tin Lo¨f test [19]. Furthermore, the Martin Lo¨f approach
does not need rely on a complex decision process involv-
ing the ill defined concept of “Complex Specified Infor-
mation”. If order is recognised, the lack of randomness
can be measured by this test.
The critical point is that as a robust universal test of
randomness (and therefore of order) exists, the scientific
community should refuse to engage in any discussions on
the possibilities of design interventions in nature that are
not articulated in terms this universal test. Discussion
on any other basis can achieve nothing.
II. ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION THEORY
AND THE MARTIN LO¨F RANDOMNESS TEST
A. Algorithmic information theory
Algorithmic Information theory measures the algorith-
mic complexity of an outcome in terms of its shortest de-
scription. Consider the following two outcomes resulting
from the toss of a coin 200 times, where heads is denoted
by a 1 and tails by a 0.
• The outcome is random represented by a se-
quence of two hundred characters of the form
“110011 . . .1100”.
• The outcome is 200 heads in a row, represented by
the sequence of 200 1’s, i.e. “111 . . .111”.
The random sequence can be generated by an algorithm
of the form: PRINT “110011 . . .10”. If the notation
| . . . | is used to denote the number of characters between
the vertical lines, |p|, the length of the algorithm p that
generates the sequence is made up of:
|p| = |110011..110|+ |PRINT |+ c.
The length of the algorithm includes the length of the
sequence or string to be printed, the length of the
“PRINT ” instruction, and a constant term reflecting
the length of the basic instruction set of the computer
implementing the algorithm. On the other hand, an al-
gorithm that generates 200 1’s is of the form PRINT
“1” 200 times. In this case the algorithm does not need
to detail the string but only to specify the number 200,
the character printed, a loop instruction that repeats the
3print command, and again a constant c. I.e. the length
of the algorithm p′ is:
|p′| = |200|+ |1|+ |PRINT |+ |loop instruction|+ c.
If p∗ is taken to represent the shortest algorithm to gen-
erate a sequence or define a structure, then in the above
cases; |p∗| ≤ |p| and p′∗ ≤ |p′|. In general, the length
|p∗| of the shortest algorithm p∗ able to generate the se-
quence, is called the algorithmic complexity of the se-
quence. As any structure or outcome can be expressed
as a sequence (or in computational terms a string), those
representing highly patterned structures will have a short
algorithmic description compared with a random string
where each character must be specified. In the above
two examples, the random outcome requires each char-
acter to be specified while the sequence of 200 heads can
be expressed by a short algorithm.
The basic concept of Algorithmic Information Theory
(AIT) was originally conceived by Solomonoff [24]. Kol-
mogorov [16] and Chaitin [4] formalised the approach
and were able to show that the computer dependence of
the algorithmic complexity can be mostly eliminated by
defining the algorithmic complexity or information con-
tent of the string s as the length of the shortest algo-
rithm that generates s on a reference Universal Turing
Machine (UTM). As such a machine can simulate any
other Turing machine [5, 19], the machine dependence
can be quantified. However, there are two alternative
formulations of the algorithmic complexity measure. The
first is known as plain algorithmic complexity and has
no restrictions on the coding used, whereas the second
restricts the coding to sets of instructions that are self-
delimiting or prefix-free. In the second case no code can
be a prefix of another, so that no end markers of algo-
rithms or instructions are needed [5, 18]. As is discussed
below, the self-delimiting version has a number of advan-
tages; one being that it can be identified with an entropy
measure.
The formal definition of plain algorithmic complexity;
i.e. the complexity measure where the computer instruc-
tions are not restricted follows. Denoting U(p) as the
computation using programme p on the Universal Tur-
ing Machine U the plain algorithmic complexity CU (s) is
given by;
CU (s) = |p
∗| = minimum |p| such that U(p) = s
As different Universal Turing Machines can be simu-
lated on each other, the algorithmic complexity measure
on a particular machine can be related to another by the
constant term c given above. This term is of order 1,
allowing the machine independent definition to be:
C(s) ≤ CU (s) +O(1).
If the computation starts with string t, i.e. t is given, the
algorithmic complexity is denoted by C(s|t). Provided
that a simple UTM is used, the O(1) term will be small
as most instructions are embedded in the programme
rather than in the description of the computer. Also,
whenever different output strings are generated on the
same machine, the computer dependence can mostly be
ignored, as the difference between the measures is usually
the relevant parameter. Furthermore, when algorithmic
instructions such as “PRINT” are common to all situa-
tions, these can also be taken as given as they also do
not affect differences between strings.
Ignoring common instructions and machine depen-
dence the algorithmic complexity of the random string
above becomes:
C(110011 . . .110) = |p ∗ | ≈ |110011 . . .110|.
Allowing for computational overheads, the algorithmic
complexity is a little more than the length of the string.
On the other hand, the ordered string of 200 heads is
represented by
C(111 . . . 111) ≈ |p′ ∗ | = |200|+ |1| (1)
+|loop instruction|. (2)
The algorithmic complexity C(110011 . . .110) requires
at least 200 bits to specify the actual string, whereas
C(111 . . .11) only needs to capture the algorithm that
specifies the integer 200, and a few more bits to account
for the loop instruction. This is a little more than 8 bits.
As a consequence, the specification of the ordered string
is close to 200− 8 bits shorter than the random string as
it has been compressed by nearly 192 bits. Kolmogorov
introduced the term “deficiency in randomness” to quan-
tify the amount of compression. Similarly Chaitin, [6], in
referring to biological structures, calls the same measure
the “degree of organisation”.
The above definition of the plain algorithmic complex-
ity “C(s)” has assumed that there is no restriction on
coding. In this paper, H(s) will be used to denote the
algorithmic complexity using self-delimiting coding, as
the complexity measure is identical to both the algorith-
mic entropy and the algorithmic information content of
the string. The formal definition of the algorithmic com-
plexity or algorithmic entropy is similar to the plain def-
inition. I.e.
HU (s) = minimum |p| such that U(p) = s,
but now the instructions in p are from a prefix-free
set. In this case, because the computational instruc-
tions have no end markers, the instructions will implic-
itly include length information. Thus an algorithm using
self-delimiting coding that otherwise would have been of
length C(s), implicitly includes up to 2log2C(s) extra
bits (see Li and Vita´nyi [19] page 194). Hence, the algo-
rithmic entropy or algorithmic complexity H(s) of string
s using self-delimiting coding is related to the plain com-
plexity by;
H(s) ≤ C(s) + 2log2C(s).
4In physical situations, as has been mentioned, there are
advantages in restricting algorithms to those that are self-
delimiting as the Kraft inequality holds. Furthermore,
while the algorithmic entropy is a measure for a particu-
lar state of the system, its expectation value is virtually
the same as the Shannon entropy for a set of outcomes [2].
Indeed, for a typical outcome representing an equilibrium
configuration, allowing for computational overheads, the
algorithmic measure returns the same value as the Shan-
non entropy or, allowing for units, the Boltzmann and
Gibbs entropies. Indeed, the Shannon entropy can be
considered as a special case of the algorithmic entropy
for a typical or random string [10, 11]. The similarity
with the Shannon entropy can be seen in relationships
like H(x, y) derived from the algorithm that calculates
both strings x and y. However in the algorithmic case,
not just x is required, but length information in the form
ofH(x) needs to be part of the input of subsequence algo-
rithms. For this reason, the algorithmic entropy H(x, y)
is given by:
H(x, y) = H(x) +H(y|x,H(x)).
For further details see Chaitin [5] and Li and Vita´nyi [19],
while Zurek [25] applies this measure to physical systems.
However in this paper, as the universal randomness test
is defined in terms of plain complexity, most of the dis-
cussion will use plain complexity. Nevertheless, when the
discussion specifically involves algorithmic entropy, as in
section IV 4, it will be understood that the entropy mea-
sure will be slightly greater than the plain algorithmic
complexity by a log2 term.
Finally, the algorithmic complexity is not computable,
i.e. there is no computable procedure to determine the
shortest algorithm to specify a particular string. How-
ever, where a compressed description is required for
structures, such as biological structures that show sig-
nificant order, this is not a problem. The mere fact the
structure is recognised shows the description can at least
be partially compressed. Always an upper level of the
algorithmic complexity exists. If more hidden structure
is found, the description can be compressed further.
B. Nomenclature
In algorithmic information theory, structures that can
be expressed by short algorithms are highly compressed.
Because such structures are simpler to describe than
more random structures, they are highly ordered, hav-
ing low algorithmic complexity. Similarly, the equivalent
algorithmic measure of information, (i.e. the algorithmic
entropy) for these ordered structures is also low. This
contrasts with Dembski’s definition of information which
characterises these structures as having high information
content.
Most ordered structures that are observed in the liv-
ing bio system are such highly ordered structures. For
example a tree can be specified in principle by specifying
the basic structure of the cell in the tree; how the cell
varies in different parts of the tree, and how cells are as-
sembled to make the tree. In the algorithmic sense a tree
is a highly ordered structure, as it has low complexity, or
equivalently low algorithmic entropy and low information
content. The degree of organisation, or the deficiency in
randomness then becomes high, as such structures have
highly compressed descriptions. Similarly in Shannon in-
formation theory, the information is a measure of the
number of decisions that need to be made to identify the
outcome. In that sense it is a measure of the uncertainty
of the outcome in the set of all outcomes. One can of
course, as Dembski does, identify the information ID as-
sociated with an event occurring with probability p by
ID = − log2 p. But, as is discussed later, the Dembski’s
approach will assign the same information content to an
outcome of 200 heads tossed in a row and an outcome
of 180 heads mixed with 20 tails. Both are ordered and
both exhibit Complex Specified Information, yet the first
outcome is far more ordered than the second. The algo-
rithmic information theory approach does not fall into
the ambiguity trap of Dembski’s information definition.
Furthermore, as is discussed below, the deficiency in ran-
domness provides an information measure with exactly
the properties required by Dembski.
C. Deficiency in Randomness and the Universal
Randomness Test
As was mentioned above the deficiency in randomness
δ(s) of string s is a measure of the non randomness of an
outcome s; i.e.
δ(s) = |s| − C(s).
In terms of self-delimiting codes, i.e. those from a prefix-
free set,
δp(s) = |s| −H(s),
where the algorithmic entropy is used instead of the plain
complexity measure. In section IV 4 a D-information
measure based on the self-delimiting version of deficiency
in randomness is defined that satisfies Dembski’s require-
ments and has the added advantage that it shows the
relationship between D-information and algorithmic en-
tropy. However, in general the plain deficiency in ran-
domness δ(s) is used to identify lack of randomness in fi-
nite strings. In this case, as δ(s) is the difference between
the uncompressed description |s| and the compressed de-
scription C(s), it measures the amount the description
can be algorithmically compressed. It can also be seen
to be a measure of the degree of organisation as it is a
measure of how far the system is from equilibrium (i.e.
from a random configuration) and therefore is a measure
of the order embodied in the structure.
As the previous section has discussed the string repre-
senting an outcome of 200 heads in a row has a deficiency
5in randomness close to 200-8, as the outcome of all heads
can be specified by a string somewhat greater than 8
bits long. This outcome would be considered a surprise,
as it is extremely unlikely to be due to chance. Such a
surprise outcome has low algorithmic complexity or low
algorithmic entropy and represents a high degree of order
or pattern.
A general Martin Lo¨f randomness test [20] involves
defining a level α at which randomness can be rejected.
If α is taken to be 2−m, this level can be characterised
by the integer m. The approach involves devising a test
procedure to order all the possible outcomes in terms of
the value of m which specifies the rejection regime. The
particular version of the test to be used below assigns the
integer m to the number of bits a string can be algorith-
mically compressed. In this case, the assignment of m is
straightforward; the strings that have been compressed
by more thanm bits are rejected as being random at level
m. In effect, one can say these non random or ordered
at level m.
However before outlining this particular case, the more
general approach to assigning the m value will discussed.
In the general case, those string that can be rejected as
random at level m + 1 are nested within the set of out-
comes or strings that can be rejected as random at level
m. Thus m labels a nested level of subsets. At m = 0, all
strings would be considered random while at m = 1 no
more than half the strings would be considered random
and so on. This allows a function Test(s) on the string s
to be used to test whether an outcome falls in the reject
region characterised by a particular m. Once a process
for determining the value of m for a string is determined,
a valid test for randomness for randomness must satisfy
the following two criteria.
1. The value Test(s) ≥ m; and
2. Test(s) restricts the total probability of all out-
comes in subset m (and its nested subsets) to be
≤ 2−m. Equivalently the total number of outcomes
in the subsetm is ≤ 2n−m when the are n outcomes
in total.
When the above conditions are satisfied, the outcome s
can be rejected as being random at level m.
Clearly the larger the value of m chosen to define the
rejection region α, the more confidently a string in the
rejection region can be rejected as random, i.e. can be
deemed as ordered, as the cumulative probability of the
occurrence of all strings in the region can be no more than
2−m. The test makes sense as it restricts the number of
strings in each subset. Furthermore, it also provides an
upper level of the probability of any string in the reject
region characterised by m as the total probability for all
these strings cannot be greater than 2−m.
In mathematical terms the test can be expressed as:
{ΣP (s) : Test(s) ≥ m} ≤ 2−m.
Or, in terms of number of outcomes # in the subset m,
{#(s)where T est(s) ≥ m} ≤ 2n−m.
While there are many valid Martin Lo¨f randomness
tests, the master stroke of the Martin Lo¨f approach is
that there are universal randomness tests. These domi-
nate all other randomness tests. In other words, no com-
putable randomness test either known, or yet to be dis-
covered, can do better than a universal test. In section
IV, a specific universal randomness test based on defi-
ciency randomness will be used to replace Dembski’s de-
cision process. The test is simple, as the label m that
identifies the level of randomness is how much the algo-
rithmic description is compressed over the full descrip-
tion. If the description is compressed by m or more bits
it it can be rejected as random at level m.
III. DEMBSKI’S DECISION PROCESS TO
INDICATE INTELLIGENT DESIGN
Dembski [7] claims to have developed a robust set of
criteria that determine whether chance or intelligent de-
sign explains certain natural events. This decision pro-
cess focuses on differentiating low probability events that
occur by chance, from similarly low probability events
that can be shown to exhibit Complex Specified Infor-
mation. Indeed Dembski claims that Intelligent Design
is a theory of information [8].
For example a coin toss of 200 times is not a surprise
if the outcome looks random, but is a surprise if the out-
come is 200 heads in a row. The latter outcome indicates
order embodied in pattern or structure. According to
Dembski, in contrast to the random outcome, the ordered
outcome has the following characteristics.
• The outcome can be specified using information
that is independent of the outcome. I.e. a pro-
cess exists to specify the ordered pattern in a way
that distinguishes it from a random outcome.
• The probability of such an ordered outcome oc-
curring by chance is low. For example, assuming
that 100 billion people have ever existed, and each
spent 70 years tossing a coin every second, only
something like 267 different outcomes involving 200
tosses would occur. As there are 2200 possible out-
comes in total, the chance of 200 heads in a row is
still minuscule.
• If such an unlikely outcome is observed, accord-
ing to the Dembski procedure, chance can be elim-
inated, and one can conclude that the outcome ex-
hibits design.
Before working through the logic and the mathematics
of the Dembski approach in more detail, the terminology
needs to be clarified.
Dembski needs to distinguish events that he calls
“specified” events from other events. For example, if a
coin is tossed 200 times, a random sequence of heads and
tails, has exactly the same probability of occurring as
a string of all heads. Both are 2−200. Dembski argues
6that the random sequence is different from the ordered
sequence as the random sequence cannot be specified. He
uses the example of an arrow being fired at a wall and
a bull’s eye being painted around the arrow. This out-
come tells you nothing about the capability of the archer.
However if the bull’s eye was painted before firing the ar-
row, and the arrow later hit the bull’s eye, the outcome is
specified. Similarly an ordered sequence is specified and
the random one is not. To be specified Dembski requires:
• That the probability of the event E must be in-
dependent of what he calls side information. I.e.
P (E|H, I) = P (E|H), where H is the chance hy-
pothesis and I is information that will be used to
specify pattern. The independence ensures that one
cannot define the pattern by reference to the event,
for example by painting the bull’s eye around where
the arrow falls.
• The specification of the pattern is denoted by D.
For example D might be the string representing
the pattern in 200 heads in a row or a string rep-
resenting the pattern embodied in, say, a biological
structure.
• Where the event E conforms to a defined pattern
D, D is said to delimit E. I.e. knowing D allows
E to be specified. Thus a patterned sequence of
1’s and zeros can map on to a coin toss sequence
of heads and tails. The patterned sequence D em-
bodies the pattern in E. The side information in
this case is information that leads to identifying
the pattern in D. Information which defines the
bull’s eye independently of the arrow is also such
side information.
• A general complexity measure φ(D|I) is defined.
To be consistent, the measure must have properties
such as redundancy, monotonicity and subadditiv-
ity in relation to the given information I. In effect
it is the measure of difficulty in defining the pat-
tern D given the side information I. For example
it could be the time, the effort, or the work needed
to define D. Dembski points out that this mea-
sure could be the memory needed in a computer to
define the pattern.
While, the algorithmic complexity measure defined
early can be made to satisfy Dembski’s definition
(see page 167 [7]), his definition is too general and
it is not clear that other workable definitions of
φ(D|I) can be found; only examples are given.
However whatever the actual measure used, Demb-
ski points out that the recognition process implied
by this measure must be tractable: the pattern
must be identified in reasonable time, or after a
reasonable number of computational steps. As a
consequence Dembski limits the degree of difficulty
by requiring φ(D|I) < λ to ensure that the pattern
is recognisable within the resource constraint λ.
• The specification process implies that the indepen-
dent side information I cannot specify E directly;
the pattern can only be specified via D Hence,
I ; E but E can be specified through I ⇒ D ⇒ E.
While the above outlines the ideas behind the process,
the following outlines the actual decision process.
1. The detailed Dembski decision process
Dembski’s design filter is a decision process to ascer-
tain whether design interventions are needed to explain
natural events. The decision process is as follows.
• Can an outcome, E, for example a highly complex
biological structure, be explained by the regularity
of natural laws?
• If not, does P (E|H, I) = P (E|H), where H is the
chance hypothesis? In which case E is independent
of side information I. For example the knowledge
of how to recognise that an outcome is ordered does
not change the probability of the outcome.
• Is there a process φ(D|I) < λ that allows the pat-
tern to be specified?
• If so, this event has been specified independently of
E. For example identifying two hundred heads in
a row specifies the pattern independently of E.
• Is the probability P (E|H) low? If E can occur
through many repeated and independent trials ΩE ,
but P (ΩE |I) < 1/2, then according to Dembski,
P (E|H) can be considered low. (As is discussed im-
mediately below, ΩE captures the possibility that
an event, such as the toss of 200 heads in a row
might occur by chance if repeated an enormous
number of times.)
• If the above shows that P (E|H) is low, the outcome
is the result of design.
Before offering an alternative and more robust test
based on Martin Lo¨f’s randomness test, some points need
to be made about multiple trials in which the event E
might materialise.
2. An aside: Difficulties with the criterion P (ΩE|I) < 1/2
As repeating a trial many times (such as repeating
the 200 tosses of a coin) increases the probability that
a particular outcome will occur by chance, any decision
process must allow for this possibility. The term “prob-
abilistic resources” refers to the set of these repeated tri-
als. For example if everyone who ever lived spent all their
7lives tossing a coin 200 times, the number of possible out-
comes is the probabilistic resource ΩE . Dembski claims
that provided
P (ΩE |I) < 1/2,
P (E|H) can be considered low, there is no need to define
“low” in terms of any rejection level α. Dembski [9] some-
what surprisingly claims that this insight even applies to
more general testing of the chance hypothesis. Despite
this claim, the rejection criterion that P (ΩE |I) < 1/2
fails when for example, the number of probabilistic re-
sources N is not large. For example if N is much less
than 100, the rejection region would not be sufficiently
discriminating. It would seem one still needs to state
what value of N is appropriate, given the number of pos-
sible outcomes, and then require that P (ΩE |I) << 1/2.
Rather than arguing using an approach that has not been
peer reviewed, one is better to use other arguments. For
example section III argues that the probability of getting
200 heads in a row by repeating the experiment 267 times
is miniscule relative to the 2200 possible outcomes
However the ambiguities and difficulties with Demb-
ski’s randomness can easily be resolved using the Martin
Lo¨f approach to randomness as is outlined in the next
IV. THE UNIVERSAL RANDOMNESS TEST
FOR DESIGN
As the test using deficiency in randomness is a uni-
versal test of randomness [19], it will be used to provide
a robust decision process to identify non random struc-
tures without the confusion of the Dembski approach.
The reason this test works is that given a string of length
k there are 2k − 2 strings of length less than k. Ignoring
the 2, there are fewer than 2k with length less than k.
This puts an upper limit on how many strings can be
compressed significantly. Most strings cannot be algo-
rithmically compressed by much, as for a given k there
are too few shorter strings and, of these, many will not
be available as they themselves may be compressed fur-
ther, or they may be compressed descriptions of longer
strings. The amount of compression defines the label m
for the Universal Martin Lo¨f test.
Given a set of strings of length n, such as those gener-
ated by the toss of a coin, the questions is: “How many
of these can be compressed by more than the integer
m?” This is equivalent to determining how many have
algorithmic complexity C(s) < n − m, or equivalently
≤ n − m − 1? From the above it follows that fewer
than 2n−m strings will have C(s) ≤ n − m − 1. As for
these strings δ(s) = n− C(s), Test(s) can be defined as
Test(s) = δ(s) − 1 ≥ m. Furthermore, the cumulative
probability of all those satisfying this criterion will be less
than 2−m which is necessary for δ(s) − 1 to be a valid
test.
Deficiency in randomness conveniently replaces the
complexity measure φ(D|I) used by Dembski, as defi-
ciency in randomness identifies a pattern D, in the event
E, given the side information embodied in programming
the Universal Turing Machine. Furthermore, the mea-
sure is independent of the outcome E as is required. As
the universal test based on the deficiency in randomness
outlined above is more robust than Dembski’s probabil-
ity test, it should be used instead. Table 1 shows how
the Dembski test (left hand column) aligns with the uni-
versal test (right hand column). Let sD be the uncom-
pressed string of length |sD| that exhibits a pattern D,
then s∗D is the most compressed binary algorithm that
generates string sD. As C(sD) = |s
∗
D|, it follows that
δ(sD)− 1 = |sD| − |s
∗
D| − 1.
All the different outcomes of a toss of 200 coins can be
placed in a column according to how much they can be
compressed; i.e. the column is ordered by δ(s) − 1. The
strings with m = 0 are of length n and are at the top.
Moving down the column, the strings can be labelled by
the integer m which shows how much the string has been
compressed. Subsets with strings compressed by more
than m are found below those that are compressed by
m. If sD is taken to be the outcome of 200 heads in a
row, using this test, an outcome of 200 heads in a row
has Test(sD) = δ(sD) − 1 ≥ 191 (i.e. 200-8-1). This
is random at level m = 191. It is a highly improbable
outcome as the total probability of all outcomes at this
level of compression is p ≤ 2−191. The advantage of this
approach is that it tells us directly that an outcome like
200 heads in a row is extremely unlikely.
The Martin Lo¨f universal test is a workable test as,
given any observable structure, it is in principle possible
to define the structure in terms of the shortest algorithm
s∗D that generates the patterned string.
If the Dembski test is a valid test for randomness it
must be able to be represented by the above universal
test [19]. Furthermore, as is shown in the next section,
the use of deficiency in randomness as the measure of
order, avoids the difficulties of the “specification” con-
cept. The measure δ by its very nature is detachable, as
it is independent of the pattern it specifies and gives a
robust test that also avoids the difficulty of calculating
ephemeral probabilities.
Furthermore, the deficiency in randomness test will
show that most living structures are not random. For
example, the flagellum propulsion unit of bacteria is a
very ordered structure. Its description is extremely com-
pressed compared with a random structure made of the
same materials. This is exactly what Dembski is try-
ing to argue. Nevertheless, the recognition of a highly
ordered structure does not indicate intelligent design un-
less a natural explanation can be completely ruled out.
However, provided the system can access highly ordered
or low entropy resources from the external environment,
there is no reason to rule out ordering through natural
processes. This shows that the Dembski design filter; i.e.
his decision process, is flawed.
A simple illustration makes this clear. While tossing
200 heads in a row is an extremely unlikely to occur by
8TABLE I: Comparison of Dembski design template with one
based on the universal randomness test.
Dembski decision process AIT decision process
Regularity and necessity?
I.e. a natural explanation Omit this step
Is it chance? Is it chance?
P (|E|H, i) = P (E|H) If m is large and
φ(D|i) ≤ λ the Martin Lo¨f test
D specified shows δ(sD)− 1 ≥ m,
Pattern D delimits E; then probability is low
Probability is low, i.e. I.e. P (sD) ≤ 2
−m.
P (ΩE|H) < 1/2,
Not chance but design Hence not chance
But design is unnecessary
if system can access
low entropy resources,
to generate the outcome.
chance it occurs in nature, every time lodestone (mag-
netite) is magnetised. Indeed magnetising a mole of lode-
stone is equivalent to getting something like tossing 1023
heads in a row. This is extremely unlikely by chance
in the life of the universe. Nevertheless, at a tempera-
ture below the Curie temperature all the magnetic spins
associated with each iron atom can align and point in
the same direction by natural processes. At higher tem-
peratures the magnetic spins will be randomly aligned.
The point is that natural laws have brought about an
event which, from a chance point of view, would be im-
possible in the lifetime of the universe. Clearly, if an
event is not due to chance, natural causes must be elimi-
nated before design interventions become an option. The
Dembski design filter completely fails as natural laws are
eliminated too early in the decision process. They must
only be eliminated at the last and critical decision point.
The final choice to be made is not between chance and
design, but between non natural design and an explana-
tion based on natural laws, recognising of course that the
laws may involve selection processes acting on variations
in structure.
Furthermore, Dembski’s approach cannot give a reli-
able value for the probability of a surprise outcome that
exhibits Dembski’s Complex Specified Information. For
example, when he attempts to determine the probability
for the occurrence of the bacterial flagella that Behe con-
sidered to be irreducibly complex [1], the attempt fails.
Dembski calculates the probability based on a random
generation process as he has already eliminated natural
processes. He should not have done this. As the cal-
culation did not take into the most likely causal paths
that might produce such a structure, the calculation is
meaningless (e.g. see Elsberry and Shallit [14], Shallit
and Elseberry [23], Miller [21] and Musgrave [22]). The
evidence is, that taking natural causes into account, the
observed structure in the Behe illustration can be plau-
sibly explained by natural processes [15].
On the other hand, the Martin Lo¨f approach gives an
upper limit on the probability of the particular outcome
once it is known how much the pattern can be com-
pressed, as was discussed above. One does not need to go
through any dubious probability calculation as a reliable
estimate comes for free; i.e. P (sD) ≤ 2
−m for the rejec-
tion region m. Furthermore, as the above test based on
deficiency in randomness is universal [19] no test Demb-
ski can define will do better; there is absolutely no need
for the Dembski decision process.
With a robust test of randomness, and with the recog-
nition that the decision in the end is between design inter-
ventions and natural laws, the decision process becomes
straightforward. The right hand column of Table 1 shows
a detailed comparison between the algorithmic approach
based on a randomness test and the Dembski decision
process (left hand column). The right hand column ap-
proach avoids the ambiguities and difficulties with Dem-
bski’s approach. In summary, the robust approach of the
right hand column in Table 1 involves the following steps.
1. Can chance explain this event; i.e. is it random
using a Martin Lo¨f universal randomness test?
2. If it is not a chance event, can the system access
more ordered or low entropy resources externally
by natural processes?
3. If, and only if, an observed natural outcome cannot
be explained by any of the above steps should non
natural design ever be considered.
The following sections indicate further difficulties and
inconsistencies with the Dembski approach.
3. The meaning of complexity
Complexity means different things to different people.
For example algorithmic information theorists would say
that the most complex strings are those that are the most
random. Scientists tend to use the word “complexity”
differently, to mean structures that are highly ordered
and are anything but random, but are not simple either.
A leaf in this view is considered a complex structure,
but it is certainly not random. In practice, these highly
ordered, but non-simple structures, would appear to be
far from equilibrium. Provided researchers are consis-
tent, and state clearly what they mean, there is little
difficulty. However, Dembski uses the word complexity
in a way that confuses. At times he identifies increasing
complexity with increasing randomness, such as when he
compares a Caesar cipher with a cipher generated by a
one-time pad ([9] page 78). At other times he identifies
increasing complex specified information with increasing
order (see [9] page 156 and 183).As the meaning of “com-
plexity” changes according to the context Dembski’s ar-
guments are unacceptably confusing (see also comments
in references [14, 23]).
94. The meaning of information
Dembski argues that information is key to unravelling
the central problems of biology quoting such notables as
Manfred Eigen [8, 9]. The trouble with this sort of argu-
ments is that there is no common understanding about
what “information” means. There is no reason to be-
lieve that D-information is related to the question Eigen
is raising. Dembski argues for his definition of informa-
tion in a number of ways. One is by comparison with
Shannon’s information theory where a message is trans-
mitted by a source, through a communication channel to
a receiver. In the Dembski case, the source message is
D embodying the pattern, and the received message is
the event E. The amount of information transmitted,
according to Dembski, is given by ID = −log2P (D|H),
assuming the chance hypothesis H . While the expected
outcome of D-information is the same as the Shannon
measure of information theory, the Shannon measure is
an uncertainty measure in a set of outcomes, and does
not correspond to Dembski’s information measure for a
particular outcome. Furthermore, Dembski uses his in-
formation concept in a way that creates difficulties. For
example, an outcome of 200 heads in a row has the same
D-information content, as an outcome of 180 heads mixed
with 20 tails both have ID = 200. Both outcomes in
Dembski’s terms are detachable, and therefore both ex-
hibit Complex Specified Information. However the 200
heads can be expressed in a little more than 8 bits and
the 180 head outcome requires a little more than 94 bits
(based on a compression ratio of plog2p+[1−p]log2[1−p]).
One outcome is far more ordered than the other. For
this reason, it is hard to see how such a measure ad-
dresses the fundamental information requirements of bi-
ology. As Algorithmic Information Theory identifies in-
formation with the algorithmic entropy, the algorithmic
measure aligns with the Shannon measure. In contrast,
the D-information measure assigns the maximum infor-
mation to ordered low probability strings; those that in
algorithmic case would have a low information measure.
However, deficiency in randomness, or degree of organ-
isation, of event E denoted by δ(E), provides a consis-
tent measure of information in the Dembski sense as was
noted by Elsberry and his co worker Shallit [13, 23] as it
is the difference between the description of a typical or
random string and the shortest description of an ordered
string. The argument is as follows, but to indicate that
prefix free coding is used, a δp will be used instead of δ.
The Martin Lo¨f test identifies that an outcome o is
non random (i.e. it is ordered) when the probability of
the outcome is P (o) ≤ 2−m and the deficiency in ran-
domness δp(o) − 1 ≥ m. If one chooses m
′, the largest
value of m that satisfies the test criteria for a particu-
lar string, then −log2P (o) ≥ m
′, and and δp(o) > m
′.
Thus one can define IˆD, a modified D-information mea-
sure by IˆD = δp(o) = |o| −H(o). This satisfies the pur-
poses of the D-information definition. More importantly,
the deficiency in randomness definition is more robust,
it does not have the ambiguities of Dembski’s defini-
tion, and it ties in with current algorithmic understand-
ings of information, entropy and order. It follows that
the algorithmic entropy, which, allowing for units, aligns
with the thermodynamic measures of entropy is given by
H(o) = |o| − IˆD. For a highly ordered or patterned out-
come IˆD is large and approaches |o| corresponding to a
low value of the algorithmic entropy H(o). Thus from
the second law of thermodynamics, as entropy cannot
decrease in a closed system by natural processes, IˆD can
never increase. From this the second law of thermody-
namics can be articulated as a law of conservation of IˆD.
5. The law of conservation of D-information
-
Dembski [9] page 172 also introduces a law of conser-
vation of information as a 4th law of thermodynamics.
According to this so called law, Complex Specified In-
formation must come from somewhere as it cannot be
generated by natural causes. Effectively the law is used
to argue that, as D-information is conserved or can only
decrease [9], outcomes that indicate design, cannot occur
by chance.
The argument for this law involves a somewhat convo-
luted discussion of the problems with Maxwell’s demon
[9]. Dembski seems unconvinced that the resolution of
the demon issue by Landauer [17] and Bennett [2, 3] is
satisfactory as Maxwell’s demon is seen to be constrained
by physical laws. As a consequence, he requires a 4th
law, the law of the conservation of information to argue
for interventions by an intelligent agent (one hesitates to
call this agent a demon) unconstrained by physical laws.
However there would appear to be a somewhat circular
argument here. As the law is needed to justify the intel-
ligent agent behind design to avoid natural explanations,
the law cannot be used as an argument for such design.
This confusion can be avoided if the deficiency in ran-
domness, is used as a robust measure of D-information
as was discussed in the previous section IV 4. This sec-
tion showed, that the deficiency in randomness measure
of D-information is the converse of the algorithmic en-
tropy; it is the difference between randomness and algo-
rithmic entropy. In this case, the second law becomes
D-information (modified as above) can never increase.
There is absolutely no need for a law of conservation of
D-information as it arises directly from the second law of
thermodynamics.
What the second law is implying is that more order
cannot arise from less order. However as is commonly
known this is not a problem. The earth is not a closed
system, highly ordered low entropy structures (i.e. high
D-information structures) emerge because the system ac-
cesses external order as high grade energy from the sun
or other sources. There is no point in claiming as Dem-
bski does in reference [9] page 173 that, as entropy can-
not decrease in a closed system, and therefore if entropy
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decreases, it is because of access to Complex Specified
Information. Such an argument is invalid unless the en-
tropy decreases and the system is shown to be closed;
something that Dembski has not done. This argument is
a more highly sophisticated version of an argument that
has refuted many times over the last fifty or more years.
Section IV 7 below indicates how algorithmic informa-
tion theory allows one to track entropy and information
at the scale of the universe.
Without the need to justify design interventions, the
so called law of conservation of information would not
have any traction even if, as is done here, D-information
is defined consistently. Current understandings of the
second law explain all that so far needs to be explained.
6. The probabilistic resources of the universe
Dembski [7, 9] attempts to provide an upper limit on
the probabilistic resources of the universe since its begin-
ning. The figure of 10150 is the estimate of all possible
outcomes of the universe. This, according to Dembski,
gives the rejection limit for any event in the universe
occurring by chance as 10−150loge2. Even if this figure
is realistic, the argument put forward is invalid, as the
states that occur when the universe unfolds, are corre-
lated. If a highly ordered configuration existed at an
early time in the universe, which is certain, even allowing
for the uncertainty principle, highly ordered and non ran-
dom events will continue to occur as the universe moves
through its state space. In other words, the alignment
of about 1023 magnetic spins in a mole of lodestone is
possible because the configuration at the present time,
is strongly correlated with past highly ordered configu-
rations. If Dembski’s argument has been introduced to
try and show a design intervention is needed to explain
improbable events, it is flawed.
The following clarifies how algorithmic entropy tracks
the evolution of the universe.
7. Order in the universe
Shortly after the Big Bang, the universe was in a highly
ordered configuration. As a consequence, if the physical
laws were completely known the string representing this
initial configuration could be highly compressed algorith-
mically in terms of physical laws. Over time the algorith-
mic description becomes longer as the universe becomes
more disordered. Because the process is far from equilib-
rium it is analogous to a free expansion as new states are
accessed during the evolving process (see Devine [11]).
Ultimately, at equilibrium, the universe will experience
heat death and the algorithmic description will describe a
random string in the set of equilibrium states. However
on our time scale, the order still exists and this order
drives the emergence of new ordered structures as the
universe evolves. Physical laws create order from less or-
dered structures provided low entropy or more highly or-
dered structures are accessible. One example, Devine [12]
is where replication processes generate new order by ac-
cessing existing order by natural means. Simple replicat-
ing systems include crystallisation processes, alignment
of magnetic spins (such as that described in lodestone),
DNA replication and stimulated emission of photons. In
such cases the emergence of new forms of order gained
by repackaging existing order is no surprise. Order does
not come from nowhere. The overall entropy of the uni-
verse increases as, during these ordering processes, heat
and/or disordered waste is passed elsewhere.
V. CONCLUSION
Dembski has claimed that an explanatory filter pro-
vides a decision template that is able to provide clear
evidence that structures observed in the universe require
a design explanation outside of nature. There are many
serious flaws with this approach that are summarised be-
low.
• Dembski’s randomness test is too ambiguous to be
workable and should be replaced by a universal
Martin Lo¨f randomness test based on Kolmogorov’s
deficiency in randomness.
• Dembski’s design template eliminates natural
causes too early, thereby forcing a design expla-
nation when none is warranted.
• Dembski’s attempt to define an information mea-
sure, Complex Specified Information to identify or-
dered structures is inconsistent. An modified mea-
sure based on Kolmogorov’s deficiency in random-
ness is a much more consistent and useful measure
of order.
• Even if Dembski’s information measure is modified
to be made consistent, the supposed law of conser-
vation of information is unnecessary. This modified
measure makes it clear that the law of conservation
of information is no more than the second law of
thermodynamics. Dembski seems to need this law
to justify the injection of external order into the
universe for ideological reasons.
• Dembski’s claim that establishing a limit on the
total probabilistic resources ΩE available requires
P (ΩE |H) < 1/2 is inadequate. While this does not
necessarily invalidate his arguments, it does suggest
that too little thought has been given to establish-
ing rejection limits in randomness testing.
In conclusion, Dembski’s approach is speculative and
there is no evidence that it offers anything from a sci-
entific point of view. That is not to say the questions
Dembski raises are not worth considering. However, in
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contrast to the Dembski approach, the universal random-
ness test, and the more rational decision process consid-
ered here are consistent with current science thinking.
As a consequence, the scientific community should refuse
to engage in any discussions on the possibilities of design
interventions in nature, unless the discussion is articu-
lated in terms of the Martin Lo¨f universal randomness
test. Discussion on any other basis will achieve little.
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